Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 6 February - 12 February 2023 (Weekly update)

(Please click here to access our weekly assessment that was published on Monday, 6FEB.)

Key takeaways from last week’s developments:

• Last week did not deliver strategic or operational changes in Ukraine;

• According to the Ukrainian General Staff data, the average number of Russian artillery strikes increased to 101 last week. On Wednesday, 116 artillery strikes were conducted, the highest number since 7SEP. Although the latter half of the week saw a decline, the overall upward trend in the number of artillery fires continued;

• Satellite imagery showed the establishment of Russian troop presence at training ranges near Kursk and Voronezh. These camps may belong to mobilised reservists, who are now being moved towards the border with Ukraine;

• We do not consider a large-scale Russian offensive to be imminent; It is also unlikely to happen this week;

• Russians may have captured some territory near Dvorchina in the Kharkiv Oblast last week, the first territorial gain in this area since the September pullback.

• The situation near Kreminna is difficult for Ukrainian forces, which continue to resist Russian airborne and mechanised forces attacks;

• In the Donetsk Oblast, Krasna Hora probably fell. Although Russians made minimal gains in Bakhmut, the situation west and north of the city deteriorated;

• There were no changes in the broader Donetsk Oblast. Russian attacks did not deliver any frontline shifts; Russians were likely pushed back from their positions southeast of Vuhledar;

• The situation in the Zaporizhihia and Kherson Oblast remained unchanged;

• The exercise tempo of the Belarusian Armed Forces remained high, but we saw no changes in the Belarusian Armed Forces’ posture.

General outlook

There were no operational or strategically significant changes on the battlefields in Ukraine last week. Russian operational tempo remained high near Kreminna, Bakhmut, Avdiivka and Vuhledar. These are the key areas where Russians attempt to push the Ukrainians back. Yet, they made marginal gains in Kreminna and Avdiivka, some gains near Bakhmut, and were defeated near Vuhledar.

Near Kreminna, Russians deployed elements of two airborne divisions, an airborne brigade, and formations belonging to a mechanised division. Pre-war, these forces combined delivered around 22,000 men. Current unofficial Ukrainian estimates place their strength at approximately 8,500 soldiers. Assuming this estimate is correct, this force is improbable to be able to conduct a large and high-tempo attack on Ukrainian positions. Especially given that subunits from at least one airborne division are deployed to fight Ukrainians in a difficult, forested terrain south of Kreminna.

Ukrainians continue to lose territory near Bakhmut. Given the trajectory of Russian gains and a lack of any larger Ukrainian counterattacks, it seems possible that the city will fall this week. Last week, Russians captured Krasna Hora, exerting even greater pressure on Bakhmut from the north. In the south, a bridge linking Bakhmut with Kostyantinivka was destroyed, effectively leaving Ukrainians with only one supply route available to support their forces in the city. With this in mind, the road leading through Chasiv Yar is also under Russian artillery fire, which makes its use highly problematic and hazardous.

Last week, Russians also made gains near Avdiivka. Although they captured two villages, this marked the first “significant” gain in this area for months. Until then, all Russian attacks had been pushed back, and the frontline south of Adviivka had barely moved since the start of the war. It does not seem that Russians are particularly focused on this sector. However, this approach may change when more reservists are sent into combat.

Lastly, Russian units suffered numerous defeats near Vuhledar. The scale of losses in manpower and equipment is believed to be significant. Currently, it seems unlikely that the settlement will be captured over the next few weeks.

So what do all of these attacks mean? It seems that Russians continue to struggle with the number of manpower and equipment at their disposal. No truly considerable gains have been made in either direction. In the Bakhmut-Soledar sector, Russians have been predominantly propelled by the Wagner PMC fighter force and their willingness to sustain heavy losses in return for small chunks of land.

Are we currently seeing a Russian offensive unfolding? It certainly is not a  large-scale deployment of combat forces many have been waiting for. Indeed, last week, Andriy Chernyak, a Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) representative, stated that Russia did not have the available resources to conduct a sizable attack on 24FEB to coincide with the first anniversary of last year’s attack.

But at the same time, we will stress that we should look at the current situation through the prism of a large offensive but a more coherent, medium-term plan centred around the Russian spring campaign. In this context, current events are undoubtedly part of a larger plan to regain the initiative and dislodge Ukrainians from the Donetsk Oblast.

With this in mind, we have not seen indications to suggest that the processes of reconstituting the Russian fighting force were completed. In other words, no large-scale employment of Russian reservists in the battle occurred. Perhaps the exception is airborne elements fighting near Kreminna. Nevertheless, over the past two weeks, Russians reestablished camps in Voronezh and Kursk Oblasts in the exact locations where Russian units were amassed during the build-up to the war. We believe that these camps house reservists, and it is the first evidence confirming their deployment closer to the frontline. It, in turn, suggests that they could soon be moved to Ukraine. Hence the tempo of attacks will increase.

After a few weeks, Russians again started to bomb key infrastructure targets in Ukraine. They also started dropping water from the Kakhovka Reservoir, which according to the ‘Zaporizhzhiya Regional Military Administration’, may cause difficulties for the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant to collect water to cool itself. Over the last month, Russians captured some 60 sq km (23 sq miles), which is above the typical tempo of Russian advances in the second phase of this war.

The number of Russian artillery strikes also continued to rise, reaching levels not seen since the summer.

All these events are interconnected, and it is clear that Moscow will use many pressure points to tilt the balance in its favour. We expect to see a continuous increase in Russian military activity over the coming weeks, but whether this will culminate in a large-scale offensive is currently impossible to predict.

Main axes of advance – 6FEB – 12FEB 2023

Situation in Belarus

Below is the summary of last week’s events in Belarus, placed into a broader context of the war in Ukraine. A full description and analysis of the military activity in Belarus are further down.

On the surface, the overall military situation in Belarus did not change. But, last week, some very important events occurred, probably bringing Belarus closer to war. Firstly, the 38th Air Assault Brigade received another full set of BTR-82As APCs. Russia needs these vehicles a lot (or any newly produced armoured vehicles), so their delivery to Belarus is puzzling. Indeed, previous deliveries occurred on 9DEC2022 and 30SEP2022. It is unclear how many vehicles were delivered in September, but the DEC2022 and JAN2023 deliveries added 80 new vehicles to Belarusian TO&E. The Belarusian Armed Forces are quickly being strengthened.

Secondly, the local security apparatus centred around the State Security Committee of the Republic of Belarus (KDB, often mistaken as KGB) held a somewhat classified exercise in the southern parts of the country. No information about the drill surfaced, but the exercise is noteworthy.

Lastly, military leadership with state representatives also held an unpublicised drill during the week, which sought to test the interoperability between military and civilian structures. It sought to find and eliminate any bottlenecks in joint operations and streamline interdepartmental cooperation.

Some elements of the 2^nd Motor Rifle Division of the Russian 1^st Guards Tank Army departed Belarus, confirmed by satellite imagery. Indeed, some reports suggested that the 1^st Motor Rifle Regiment, previously deployed in Vitebsk, was seen near Kreminna. The number of tents seen on a training ground near Baranovichi also decreased. On the other hand, the range’s medical facility was expanded, confirming plans to continue to use the site for further training.

Weather forecast

(Lowest temperatures are for nights and highest for days)

This week will continue to deliver sub-zero temperatures in the Kharkiv Oblast. A thaw is now expected next week. Until Wednesday, temperatures will hover around 0°C (32°F). However, a freezing spell lasting three days is expected to arrive mid-week. Temperatures will drop to -11°C (12°F)  (lowest temperatures are for nights only) on Thursday. Snow showers are also expected in the latter half of the week. However, the weather will improve since Friday, and the temperature will quickly rise to around 0°C (32°F) on Saturday/Sunday.

The same pattern will occur in Bakhmut. A drop in the temperature is expected on Wednesday (-11°C (12°F), while 2°C (35°F) is forecasted for Sunday.

Zaporizihia will undergo a similar change, however, the weather amplitude will be smaller. Freezing temperatures at night are expected on Wednesday and Thursday (-7°C(29°F)), followed by a steady rise to 4°C (40°F) forecasted for Sunday.

Although we are not meteorologists, the weather is entering the pre-spring mode, and the likelihood of any longer freezing spells is minimal. A 45-day weather forecast shows that the current temperatures will remain in Ukraine until mid-March. After that, they will increase above 5°C (41°F).

Consequently, the current weather does not support large-scale armoured operations across Ukraine.

Summary of losses

According to the Russian Ministry of Defence, since the start of the war, Ukraine has lost 384 aircraft (+2), 207 helicopters (+1), 3,105 UAVs (+82), 404 anti-aircraft missile systems (launchers?)(+1), 7,750 tanks and other armoured combat vehicles (+90), 1,015 MLRS launchers (+8), 4,073 field artillery guns and mortars (+70), as well as 8,272 units of special military vehicles (+78).

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, Russia lost (eliminated) 137,780 personnel (+6,490), 3,280 tanks (+60), 6,488 armoured combat vehicles (+53), 2,287 artillery systems (+61) and 465 MLRS (+5), 234 anti-aircraft systems (+7), 296 aircraft (+2) and 286 helicopters (+2), and 1,958 UAVs (+49), 5,091 vehicles and fuel tanks (+57), 857 cruise missiles (+61), 18 warships and boats (0) and 215 pieces of special equipment (+12).

(Numbers in parentheses denote a weekly change).

Looking solely through the prism of numbers provided by the UGS, one could get the impression that Russians started an offensive, which was being successfully repelled by Ukrainian units. Russians saw increased losses across the entire board compared to the previous week. The number of “eliminated” personnel continued to rise, equaling three regiments lost last week. Other losses were severe too. For instance, two weeks ago, Russians lost 23 tanks, compared to 60 last week. An increase was also seen in armoured vehicles (39 vs 53), artillery systems (31 vs 61) and UAVs (11 vs 49).

Interestingly, if we look only at the ratio of personnel to land-based equipment losses, the former continues to rise, while the latter is largely flat. It could suggest that Russian attacks are very infantry-centric with limited armoured support.

Russian troop and land-based equipment losses (Source: Ragnar Gudmundsson)

Artillery strikes

Development of reported shellings since June 9 (Source: Ragnar Gudmundsson)

Ukrainian General Staff reported shellings by city and oblast for the past seven days (Source: Ragnar Gudmundsson)

According to the Ukrainian General Staff, last week saw a significant increase in the number of Russian artillery strikes. The only region where a decrease was reported was in the Chernikhiv Oblast, while Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk remained the same. A particular rise was reported in Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhihia Oblasts.

On 8FEB (Wednesday), Russians reportedly conducted 116 artillery strikes, the highest number since 7SEP, when 139 locations were struck. Since Thursday, artillery fires decreased to 95 and 99 on Friday and Saturday, respectively. The seven-day average increased to 101 strikes, compared to 93 two weeks ago.

Russian artillery fires are constantly on the rise since mid-January. We noted this in the previous update: “Generally, the upward trend in the average number of Russian artillery strikes continued. It reached a high point on 2FEB when the average hit 93 strikes over the previous seven days. However, since then, there has been a gradual decrease in the number of areas hit. On 4FEB, “only” 72 settlements were struck, bringing the average down to 89. The next week will see whether this drop is short-lived or is falling back to a long-term average in the number of strikes, which is between 70-90 hits per day.”

Based on last week’s data, it appears that Russian artillery increased the tempo of their strikes, which may be a prelude to more decisive ground action over the following weeks.

Heatmap with reported shellings, past seven days (Source: Ragnar Gudmundsson)

Military situation in Belarus

Last week was relatively calm regarding the general situation in Belarus, although several noteworthy events occurred. They stem from political decisions and the continuation of intensified training activities. The posture of the Russian forces deployed in Belarus remains essentially unchanged. That said, last week, Russian air components trained heavily, while several Russian ground transfers were particularly interesting.

Regarding the political developments impacting the Belarusian Army, last week, the Deputy Chief of General Staff, Maj. Gen. Igor Korol reached retirement age and was placed in reserve. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenka replaced the Chief of Communications (Head of the Communication Department), Maj. Gen. Oleg Mischenko with Col. Vadim Romaniv. The rotations were also carried out on the “lower” command levels as Col. Dmitry Bitny became a new Deputy Commander of the Western Operational Command.

Concerning Belarusian state officials’ activities, State Military Industrial Committee Members held a board meeting. The committee chairman, Dmitry Pantus, led the meeting, where participants discussed issues relating to weapon supplies to the Belarusian Armed Forces.
According to Pantus, the state industry provided more than 500 military systems to the armed forces last year. His subordinates paid particular attention to close cooperation between the Belarusian Army and the domestic defence industry, which is especially important in the current international environment. Pantus also stated that preliminary tests of the T-72BM2 were completed. The T-72BM2 is the upgrade to the Belarusian T-72B tank. Officials claim that the tank is not inferior to the Russian T-72B3, while some characteristics surpass the Russian equivalents. The BM2 features an improved control system, a Sosna-U multichannel sight, and Belarusian-made explosive reactive and slat armour. The T-72BM2 is currently being evaluated within the land force formations, a process that is to conclude in April. The  Belarusian State Military Industrial Committee plans to upgrade 20-30 tanks annually.

Following the disastrous earthquake in Turkey, a special search and rescue detachment of the Belarusian Ministry of Emergencies departed to support Turkish rescue efforts on Wednesday. An Il-76MD transport aircraft from the 51^st Mixed Aviation Base carried more than 60 service members, with five search dogs and four vehicles.

Last week, the Belarusian Armed Forces leadership, including the Secretary of the State Security Council, Lt. Gen. Alexander Volfovich, his First Deputy, Maj. Gen. Pavel Muraveiko, Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin and Chief of Belarusian General Staff, Maj. Gen. Viktor Gulevich took part in a large-scale training (Table Top Exercise: TTX?) with the state body’s representatives. The drill lasted three days (Thuesday-Thursday) and, according to Volfovich, was initiated by the Belarusian President to ensure interoperability and effective actions of the Belarusian government and military bodies under any conditions. Volfovich claimed that the role of the exercise was crucial mainly due to the aggravation of the military-political situation near Belarusian borders. His deputy noted that the drill focused on the issue of interdepartmental cooperation, especially in identifying and eliminating the so-called “bottlenecks” in the joint operations. According to Muraveiko, engaged state agencies demonstrated their abilities to take quick and effective actions and proved that the Belarusian National Security System is ready for any risk and challenges.

The Belarusian Minister of Defence had one informational briefing. It occurred on Friday when he addressed students and employees of Gomel State University. Officially the briefing pertained to the current situation around Belarus. However, Lt. Gen. Viktor Khrenin spoke mainly about “information hygiene” during the event. He highlighted the necessity of verifying information, primarily using government sources. Khrenin stated that aggressive developments might be provoked outside the state, as during the 2020 crisis.

On Friday, the Commander of the Belarusian Special Operation Forces, Maj. Gen. Vadim Denisenko took part in an official ceremony in the 38^th Air Assault Brigade, which received 40 (a full battalion set) BTR-82A APCs. Specifically, the 382^nd Air Assault Battalion obtained standard vehicles (BTR-82A) and several specialised variants, such as BTR-80Ks (command-staff vehicle), BREM-Ks (recovery vehicle), as well as BTR-80BMMs (medical aid vehicle) and R-185s (communication vehicle).

The First Deputy Chief of Armaments, Maj. Gen. Alexander Fedin also commented on ongoing modernisation programmes. He noted that in 2023, Belarusian military formations would obtain T-72BM2 tanks and modernised BTR-70 APCs (BTR-70MB1 standard). Additional plans include the acquisition of additional radio-technical complexes (Sopka, Protivnik, And Vostok) and air assets (Su-30SM and Mi-35M).

Unofficial sources published information about plans to build infrastructure to support a new military presence in Gomel. Specifically, this refers to the creation of:

• military town in the Gomel Oblast (2023-2027);

• training ground in the Gomel Oblast (2023-2027);

• Reconstruction of the military barracks in Luniniets (2022-2023).

All investments will cost more than BYN 80,000,000 and are likely connected to the creation of the new (southern) operational command.

The Belarusian military leadership opened enrolment for certain military studies for women. According to the Head of the Department for the Use and Development of UAVs, Col. Mikhail Bryansky, women will be able to join the Military Faculty of the Belarusian State Aviation Academy in specialisations related to unmanned aerial vehicles.

Last week, the tempo of the Belarusian Armed Forces’ training regime remained high. Excluding the abovementioned TTX, several other training events took place. Interestingly, they timely matched up with adopting Belarusian reservists to several unspecified military formations. Some of them were involved in a combat readiness check at the Belarusian Military Academy that started on Monday.

Among the Belarusian Special Operation Forces, two bilateral tactical exercises were held. They occurred both in the 38^th Air Assault Brigade (Tuesday-Wednesday) and 103^rd Airborne Brigade (?-Friday) and involved company-level formations (coy against coy). Moreover, reconnaissance subunits of the 38^th Air Assault Brigade underwent standalone field exercises on Monday. They were carried out on the brigade’s training ground (Brestsky).

Regarding the mechanised formations, the training load was evenly distributed. The following drills were reported:

• 6^th Mechanised Brigade:

  • Practical training with explosives of the engineering-sapper battalion (Wednesday, Thursday-?);

  • Tactical exercise of the unspecified mechanised subunit (Thursday-Friday);

  • Possible continuation of the combat readiness check of the 350^th Artillery Group (Thursday)

• 11^th Mechanised Brigade:

  • Preparation for the “demonstration exercise” (Tuesday);

  • T-72 firing classes (Thursday);

• 19^th Mechanised Brigade:

  • Tactical and fire training (Wednesday);

  • Next stage of the combat readiness check (Friday);

• 120^th Mechanised Brigade:

  • T-72 firing classes of the 355^th Tank Battalion (Tuesday);

  • Tactical and firing classes of the 339^th Mechanised Battalion (Tuesday);

Regarding the support formations, on Wednesday, the 2S5 Giatsint battery of the 51^st Artillery Brigade took part in a special tactical exercise with live ammo firing. Classically, service members used Mavic 3 UAVs to adjust fire. Practical actions were held likely until Friday when Belarusian MoD officially confirmed the end of the 51^st Artillery Brigade field exit.

The 377^th Air Defence Regiment continued practical activities in “the field”. Elements of the regiment (likely one air defence battalion) left the home garrison a few weeks ago and are currently training in the Hlybokaye district. For example, on Friday, the unit’s equipment (S-300 launchers) was spotted in Polotsk.

Between Tuesday-Thursday the Belarusian KDB (KGB) carried out drills in the Klichevsky district that involved dozens of military vehicles marked with a star symbol. Local residents were prohibited from taking pictures, making videos of military equipment, and reporting about their movements. Nevertheless, the Belarusian MotolkoHelp military monitoring team could still localise one of the security forces’ bases (Nesyata).

Last week, more Belarusian military equipment was spotted on the roads. However, it was directly linked to the ongoing drills. It pertains mainly to BTR APCs and several trucks. Nonetheless, the unofficial sources also reported transfers of a BUK air defence launcher (Monday) and a few BRDM reconnaissance vehicles (Friday).

As stated earlier, the Russian forces’ activity was visible, especially in the air. Over the past week, at least two cargo aircraft arrived in Belarus. It involved an unspecified An-26 (Monday) and an An-12 (RF-90787) that landed a day later. Russian fighter aircraft and helicopters were especially visible on Tuesday and Friday. Despite relatively “standard”  flights of the A-50 AEW&C aircraft with a MiG-31K supersonic interceptor aircraft escort, the increase in helicopter activity particularly stood out.

The ground activity of the Russian Armed Forces elements was somewhat low. Several various trucks and light vehicles were observed throughout the week. However, the movement of two military echelons was recorded on Wednesday and Friday. The first transported about 30 BMPs, while the second carried several trucks.

Data obtained through satellite imagery analysis shows two things:
Firstly, the 230th Combined-Arms Training Ground Obuz-Lesnovsky continued to host Russian forces (15th Motor Rifle Regiment, 2nd Motor Rifle Division, 1st Tank Army). However, a slightly reduced number of heated tents and the variety of vehicles suggests a change in the type of troops exercising there. The number of tents also decreased from 144 to 135 between 19DEC and 6FEB.

Multiple tire marks suggest frequent exercises on the tactical training lines.

The field hospital was also expanded, which suggests a further increase in the capacity of the complex.

When it comes to the Losvido Training Ground near Vitebsk (1st Motor Rifle Regiment, 2nd Motor Rifle Division, 1st Tank Army), imagery showed a decreased presence o medium tents in camp by 14 and a significant reduction in the number of vehicles in the motor pool and the training area by 100 compared to imagery from late December.

However, the increased number of ricochet marks and footprints of soldiers walking to targets at the shooting range suggests an intensification of target shooting training.

There are also noticeable tire tracks on the tactical training ground, which suggests exercises with vehicles.

Below is the summary of last week’s Belarusian training activities. Click here to access data for the entire month.

The situation at selected axes and directions

Kharkiv direction

We continue to see no significant changes on the battlefields in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts. Last week saw a somewhat increased number of Russian ground attacks in both regions. Kharkiv Oblast, in particular, saw a significant departure from Russian operations conducted for the past couple of months. Significant in that, up until last week, Russian activity had been limited to the actions undertaken by reconnaissance and sabotage groups and occasional reconnaissance-by-force assaults. We also noted on 6FEB that Ukrainians increased the combat readiness of two battalions (territorial defence) in the Hryanykivka-Syn’kivka-Petropavlivka line near Kupyansk. It appears that this decision was correct and heralded what was to come. Indeed, Russians became active near Synkivka, which according to some Russian sources, was captured. There were also attempts to dislodge Ukrainians from Masiutivka. Regular skirmishes also occurred east of Dvorchina, on the eastern bank of the Oskil River. On Friday, the Russian MoD claimed that the city was captured. Despite Russian reports about territorial gains, no independent information surfaced last week to confirm any Russian tactical successes.

Our understanding is that while these attacks may seek to divert Kyiv’s attention from other areas and force it to contend with attacks on multiple aces across the winder front, they are too small to alter the frontline in any significant way or seek to achieve any operational success.

A Russian source claimed that Ukrainians were expecting a big Russian offensive from the Belgorod Oblast in Russia towards the Kharkiv Oblast. Ukrainian presence in the border areas has been strengthened, and all leaves have been terminated. Reconnaissance UAVs also fly near the border to detect any changes in the Russian posture on the other side of the border.

However, Russians are unlikely to be preparing for any larger offensive in this direction, at least until the end of this month. We see no evidence to suggest that Russians are concentrating their forces on this axis (Dvorchina-Kupyansk).

There are a couple of reasons for that. Firstly, if they nevertheless planned to launch a sizable attack in this area, we would expect to see increased Russian ground activity in the border regions in the Kharkiv Oblast (Valyuki-Belgorod on the Russian side of the border) before any significant attack. None of such activity is currently ongoing, while the last Russian cross-border ground attack occurred in December.

Secondly, Russians also continue to launch artillery and missile strikes on Ukrainian military and civilian targets in the Kharkiv Oblast. Many of these strikes, especially the ones that strike targets at the rear, are launched from S-300 air defence systems. They are thus more concerned about maintaining an appropriate level of fire than they are about precision. Although the number of artillery strikes has been somewhat increasing since DEC2022, this rise is very incremental. However, on 8FEB, 35 locations in the Kharkiv Oblast were shelled by Russian artillery, which is the highest number since mid-August. It was also a sharp increase compared to previous days. After that, on 10FEB, the number went down to only 16. The increase noted on 8FEB thus appears short-lived. This week should confirm this hypothesis.

Luhansk direction

The situation in Luhansk Oblast remained essentially unchanged. Most of the fighting occurred near Kreminna, while battles in other areas mainly had a positional character without impacting the frontline.

Let’s focus on some key areas. Firstly, the Novoselivske-Kuzemivka area is still contested. Reports from late last week suggested that the former is under Ukrainian control, and battles for Kuzemivka were ongoing. As such, the situation in this sector hardly changed over the past few weeks. Even if Ukrainians liberate Kuzemivka, the impact on the overall situation will be negligible. Everything is simply happening too slowly.

Secondly, Russian efforts to dislodge Ukrainians from Makiivka did not stop. The attackers had been trying to push Ukrainians out of the village and over the Zherebets River for the past few weeks. However, these attempts were futile. The frontline in this area hardly moved.

Regarding Kreminna, let’s first look at what various officials said last week.

Firstly, Leonid Pasechnik, the Luhansk People’s Republic Head, provided a bit made a contradictory statement to the prevailing narrative on the situation in the oblast. He stated the UAF had accumulated enough forces to launch a counterattack. He said that Ukrainians focus not only on Svatove or Kreminna but also on other regional cities, such as Lysychansk, Rubizhne and Troitske. Russian sources claimed that Ukrainians deployed 30,000-35,000 men for this offensive. There were indeed some rumours last week that Ukrainians pushed towards Lysychansk, but they seemed a bit unrealistic, and we have never confirmed their authenticity.

The Russian source stated that Russian units gradually pushed Ukrainians west. According to a Ukrainian source, Russians advanced around 100-200 meters a day, and the UAF was constantly pressured to fall back from some positions.

From the Ukrainian side, the situation appears to be grave. According to Serhiy Haidai, the Luhansk Regional Military Civil Administration Head, near Kreminna, Russians undertake daily attempts to break through Ukrainian defensive lines. He described the current situation in this area as “maximum escalation”. Despite this, he claimed that, so far, Russian actions were best characterised as reconnaissance-by-force rather than an offensive. However, Haidai asserted that due to the reconnaissance part of the attack, Russians suffered significant losses in the oblast, but he did not elaborate on this further. Haidai also stated that the Ukrainian forces controlled the situation. Kyiv also possesses information about Russian manoeuvre and reserve forces deployed in the oblast. He said that long-range fires could destroy Russian logistics and weapon supply routes in the Luhansk Oblast.

Based on what Haidai said, it is unclear if Russians know where Ukrainian positions are (presumably due to limited ISR) and are forced to conduct reconnaissance-by-force attacks to reconnoitre Ukrainian units’ strength and unit locations. Such an approach brings in casualties. Secondly, we are not sure whether statements about Kyiv’s ability to significantly hinder the movement of supplies to the Luhansk Oblast are fully justified. As stated in the previous weekly update, Russians have dispersed. We continue to see a decrease in the number of high-precision fires in the Luhansk Oblast (or across Ukraine in general), which means that Russians have adjusted their operations and logistics to this threat. As a result, Ukrainians are running out of targets to hit. The flow of supplies to the Luhansk Oblast is indeed impeded and does not resemble a stream. Instead, Russians have opened multiple trials to ensure their forces are appropriately provisioned. So far, this approach has worked, and Russians appear to be relatively well sustained near the frontline. Of course, logistics support for defensive operations is not as demanding as for offensive ones, so it will be interesting to see how logistics will keep up if the posture in the Kharkiv Oblast changes.

Based on force dispositions, the Kreminna area definitely seems prioritised.

Russians have reportedly finished the redeployment of some elements of the 2nd Motor Rifle Division from Belarus (presumably the 1st Motor Rifle Regiment (MRR)) and the 26th Tank Regiment (TR) of the 47th Tank Division (TD). Both divisions are under the 1st Guards Tank Army’s Command.

We also understand that the Russian 76th Air Assault Division (104th, 234th, 237th Air Assault Regiments) primarily operates in the Serebryan forest south of Kreminna. Some reports last week alleged that Ukrainians had been pushed to the Siverskyi Donetsk River (an area linked for an illustrative purpose). Still, it was never confirmed in which area such a development reportedly occurred.

The 331^st and 217^th Airborne Regiments from the 98th Airborne Division were also reportedly moved to the Kreminna area. One of them has already been allegedly employed in combat operations near Dibrova.

Engineering and demining units from the 144^th Motor Rifle Division started demining activities near Yampolivka, which indicates preparations for further attacks in this area. Manoeuvre elements from this division will also likely lead to any future attacks. The 59th Tank Regiment from this division is reportedly attacking Ukrainian positions near Torske.

The 31st Separate Air Assault Brigade is held in reserve. According to the Kyiv-based Centre for Defence Strategies, the Russian presence near Kreminna is around 8,500-8,700 men. Based on the number of units deployed into the area, this assessment is either inaccurate (strength is underestimated), or Russian units are significantly understaffed due to the losses sustained in this war. For context, pre-war, the 76th Air Assault Division had almost 8,000 men alone.

CDS also noted that Russians are setting up 85^th and 88^th Motor Rifle Brigades that fall under the 2^nd Army Corps (DPR), which, in turn, reports to the Russian 8^th Combined Arms Armies. These brigades are to comprise the 202^nd Rifle Regiment, and 290th, 293rd,
259th, 294th, 302nd, 314th, and 315th Rifle Battalions of the mobilisation. Each brigade is expected to be 2,500 men strong. These units are primarily being stood in Novoaidar and Starobilsk. Thus, their main objective would be to defend Luhansk Oblast in depth.

So far, despite such an accumulation of various units, the impact on the frontline was minimal. Ukrainians continue to defend their positions west of Dibrova. Russians mentioning that Torske was being attacked could indicate that Ukrainians nevertheless fell back to the village, but this information was not independently confirmed. South of Kreminna, Ukrainians were little forced to withdraw deeper into the Serebryan forest, but heavy battles in this area were still ongoing. As such, the situation is more or less stable. If reports suggesting that only one assault brigade (and probably elements of the 98^th Airborne Division) is held in reserve are accurate, then Russian capacity to mount a large-scale attack near Kreminna is very limited. Unless more units are deployed, we are unlikely to see changes in the intensity of attacks and the progress these assaults deliver.

Frontlines in the Kharkiv and Luhansk Oblasts with Russian artillery strikes and Russian fortifications, 6FEB – 12FEB 2023

Donetsk Oblast Direction

It has been one month since Wagner OMC forces captured Soledar (between 10-13JAN). Since then, looking at a strategic perspective, Russian troops have made incremental gains around Soledar and Bakhmut.

Bakhmut remains the epicentre of the fighting in the Donetsk Oblast. However, last week, Russian attacks increased in intensity on other axes, such as near Avdiivka and Vuhledar, delivering somewhat mixed results.

Starting from the north, the attackers continued their attacks towards Spirne, which remains the primary target for Russian forces operating in the northern parts of the Donetsk Oblast. Despite daily attempts to break through Ukrainian defences near Spirne and Verkhnokamyanske and Rozdolivka, Fedorivka and Vesele, Ukrainian defensive positions remained unchanged. In fact, since capturing Sakko i Vantsetti two weeks ago, Russians have made no progress north of Soledar. Whereas Russia may still advance in this area over the coming weeks, it is clear that the priority in terms of artillery attacks and ground forces employment was placed on Bakhmut and surrounding areas, which now create the centre of (tactical) gravity in the war for the Donetsk Oblast. That said, assuming that Bakhmut falls, we still maintain that the impact on the overall operational picture will be limited. Ukrainians will pull back to other previously prepared positions to continue to stall Russians and make them fight for every kilometre of the territory.

Last week, Russians made some progress towards severing the M03 highway linking Bakhmut with Slovyansk. This ground line of communication may have been cut, but the impact of this development will likely be minimal because Ukrainians had been limiting their reliance on this particular road for weeks. Nevertheless, Russians extended their attacks last week towards Orikhovo-Vasylivka and Dubovo-Vasylivka. Despite being repelled, these attacks confirm Russian determination to cut off Krasna Hora and, together with attacks from Klishchiivka, suggest that the plan is a bigger envelopment operation to cut off Bakhmut.

Ukrainians were on the verge of being dislodged from Krasna Hora, especially given the abovementioned attacks on supply routes to the settlement. A group of Finnish OSINT researchers claimed on Saturday, 11FEB that the village had been taken. We warned in the daily updates that Ukrainian units probably started pulling back from Krasna Hora during the week.

The front shifted to Paraskoviivka. However, it seems that Ukrainians were also being squeezed out of this area too. Geolocated footage shows battles ongoing in Stupky, just north of Bakhmut.

The situation in Bakhmut did not undergo any major changes. Russians probably made some gains within the city, but they were marginal. Currently, the decision to pull back from Bakhmut solely depends on the Ukrainian ability to supply and logistically sustain their forces in this area. This ability is getting increasingly limited.

Indeed, for the whole week, Russians tried to break through Ukrainian defensive lines in Ivanivske but failed. Nevertheless, reports surfaced that the Russians cut off the Kostyantynivka-Bakhmut road, although only temporarily. On Saturday, 11FEB, footage emerged showing a Kostyantinivka – Bakhmut bridge destroyed. It is unclear whether Russians or Ukrainians did this, but the result is that Kyiv can only provision Bakhmut forces through one road that goes through Chasiv Yar, which is also under Russian artillery fire. Clearly, if Ukrainians were behind the explosion, they shaped the battlefield for withdrawal. As Ukrainian positions in Bakhmut are under increased threat, we may see a larger withdrawal from Bakhmut (and thus increased Russian tempo of advance) as early as this week.

The operational situation in the Bakhmut-Soledar line

Another area where Russians captured territory was west of Avdiivka. Russians had been trying to capture the city for months. In fact, Avdiivka is very close to the line of contact that was shaped in 2014 and remained intact until FEB22. In this context, the frontline near Avdiivka barely moved since the start of the war a year ago. Russians alternated their actions towards the town between artillery strikes and ground assaults, which did not bring any results. Only last week did Russian units capture Vodiane and Opytne. It could indicate that the larger plan is to encircle Avdiivka, especially if Russians start moving around Krasnohorivka. However, nothing suggests that they can conduct such a manoeuvre, especially given that the priority is firmly placed on Bakhmut.

Some Russian reports also suggested that Russians tried to flank Ukrainian positions in western Mariinka and entered territory held by the defenders. This information, however, was never confirmed, and we continue to maintain that the control over the city is split roughly in half.

Lastly, Vuhledar. Having suffered heavy losses, Russians decreased their attacks on the settlement in the first half of the week. However, the latter half again saw Russian attempts to capture the city. We assess that the Pacific Fleet’s 40^th and 155^th Naval Infantry Brigades (again) lost their combat capability due to the initial round of assaults and were withdrawn.

Just one assault resulted in Russians losing around 30 vehicles, including 13 tanks (T-72B3s), 12 BMP-1/2s, and a couple of MT-LBs. It seems that Russians used a company tactical group (CTG) as the primary combat element in this assault, which confirms the Russian inability to muster a larger force, at least in this direction. Without infantry and effective counterbattery fire, any CTG is unlikely to break any Ukrainian defensive lines, especially those deeply entrenched near Vulhedar.

Satellite imagery acquired 10FEB shows the scale of artillery fires in this area.

Whereas attacks on Vuhledar are likely to continue, we assess the probability of Russians capturing the village now are low.

Satellite image over Vuhledar, 10FEB2023

Frontlines in the Donetsk Oblast with Russian artillery strikes and Russian fortifications, 6FEB – 12FEB 2023

Zaporizhzhia direction

It has been over three weeks since Russians announced significant territorial gains in the Zaporizhihia Oblast. All such claims were subsequently refuted. The frontline is stable, and ground operations are subdued. In terms of combat operations, southern Ukraine has been deprioritised for both Russia and Ukraine. Most attacks conducted in the Kherson and Zaporizhihia Oblasts have either a positional character or seek to reconnoitre opposing units (OPFOR) by force. We foresee no changes in how attacks are conducted in this part of the country.

Zaporizhihia Oblast, in particular, has often been mentioned in various open-source publications as one of the areas where Russians could conduct a larger-scale attack (other areas included Bakhmut and Kreminna). However, we continue to see no signs of any preparations for such an attack. There are no Russian troop and equipment concentration areas that would indicate a build-up, even in areas beyond the HIMARS range. Storage facilities in Crimea, for instance, have not seen a significant drawdown either.

Neither side appears to be currently able and/or willing to deploy enough forces into the region to break the deadlock.

Local skirmishes nevertheless occur. For instance, Russian sources reported on Russian assaults on Novoandriivka on Thursday (9FEB) and Novodanylivka on Friday (10FEB) but delivered no results. Russians also conduct routine artillery strikes on civilian and military targets in the oblast, mainly focusing on areas near Hulyaipole and Orikhiv.

Ukrainian activity was limited too. Last week, Russians released only one video reportedly showing artillery striking a Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance group near Kruhle Lake. However, it was unclear when the video was made.

Frontlines in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast with Russian artillery strikes and Russian fortifications, 6FEB – 12FEB 2023

Kherson direction

The situation in the Kherson Oblast remains unchanged as well. Both sides continue artillery attacks across the Dnipro River, trying to degrade OPFOR’s presence. Skirmishes occur not on land but in the Dnipro delta and Kinburn Spit. Natalia Humenyuk, the spokesperson for the Southern Operational Command, stated last week that Russians had increased the number of reconnaissance and sabotage operations in the Dnipro delta. The data provided by various Ukrainian official sources do not confirm this growth. When they do happen, these missions are nevertheless very limited in scope and predominantly seek to force Ukrainians to contend with another area where Russian attacks (which can ultimately threaten Kherson) occur.

Last week, Kherson Oblast advisor Serhiy Khlan claimed that a possibility exists that Russians may launch an offensive in the southern direction. However, we assess that there is no threat to Kherson, while Russian ability to conduct a river-crossing operation in the Kherson Oblast, despite significantly reduced Ukrainian operational forces presence, is currently non-existent.

Last week, Ukrainians reportedly hit three Russian troop concentration areas in the region (presumably with HIMARS), destroyed a Russian watercraft in the Dnipro delta and two sabotage and reconnaissance groups on the Kinburn Spit, and hit a Russian base on the Dnipro’s east bank, probably near Kardashynka.

Frontlines in the Kherson Oblast with Russian artillery strikes and Russian fortifications, 6FEB – 12FEB 2023

Outlook for the week of 13FEB – 19FEB

In assessing the probability or likelihood of certain events, we will use a set of terms followed by the US Intelligence Community.

We have decided to introduce more accountability to our forecasts. Therefore, each weekly update assesses how correct (or incorrect) our predictions were. Here is what we said last week. Please also remember that while we try to remain as objective as possible regarding our performance, the reader will ultimately have to decide how (in)accurate we have been.

Last week’s forecast

This is what we forecasted last week:

“We expect to see no changes in the Kharkiv Oblast. Both sides will highly likely continue positional battles and artillery strikes. Russians will also certainly continue to conduct artillery strikes on civilian areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and other regions near the state border.” It was quite easy to forecast Russian artillery strikes across the oblast, but we failed to anticipate increased Russian attacks east of Dvorchina and reported success they achieved near Synkivka.

Score: 0/1

“Based on last week’s operations, it is likely that no significant changes will occur in the Luhansk Oblast. We continue to maintain that tactical fluctuations are highly likely, but neither side will be able to turn these into operational successes. Despite reports about the upcoming Russian offensive, we see no evidence confirming Moscow is building its forces in the Luhansk Oblast.” This forecast was correct. Except for Kreminna, battles resulted in no shifts to the frontline.

Score: 1/1

“Ukrainians lost the attacking initiative near Kreminna, and their chances of capturing the city are currently remote. On the other hand, Russians will highly likely continue pressing Ukrainians west of Kreminna. Further territorial gains in this sector are likely.” Last week, Russians probably made limited gains, but not west of Kreminna, but south. Russians appear to fully control the situation in this sector.

Score: 1/1

“We do not foresee major changes in the Donetsk Oblast. Russian attacks will highly likely persist, but their ability to capture new territories is limited. We see no evidence to suggest Russians are preparing for a broader offensive in this direction. Unless Russians commit reserves to the battle, it is unlikely that Vuhledar will fall next week.” Although no major changes occurred last week in the region, Russians nevertheless made minor gains and captured Vodyane and Opytne. Vuhledar is under Ukrainian control, and no large-scale attack happened.

Score: 1/1

“Russians are likely to progress in the Soledar-Bakhmut sector. Firstly, they will likely extend territorial gains north and northwest of Soledar and approach Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka. The current operational picture is that Krasna Hora is indefensible. The settlement will fall, but we are not sure when this will happen. It is possible that such a development can occur next week.” We will give ourselves half a point for this forecast. On the one hand, we predicted the fall of Krasna Hora, but our primary focus was on the northern sectors, which seem to have been put on a back burner.

Score: 0.5/1

“Regarding Bakhmut, we will maintain our last week’s prognosis. Unless Ukrainians start withdrawing, Russians are only likely to make incremental gains within the city. Currently, it is highly improbable that Ukrainians will pull back from Bakhmut. The situation in Bakhmut is strongly linked to what is occurring southwest of the city. The fall of Ivanivske, unlikely to happen next week, could have a domino effect and force Ukrainian withdrawal from Bakhmut.” Russians made incremental gains last week in Bakhmut, while Ukrainians keep them off Ivanivske. That said, reports already surfaced that Russians temporarily physically cut the road linking Bakhmut with Kostyantynivka.

Score: 1/1

“Regarding the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, it is likely that Russian positional attacks will continue. A possibility exists that they will capture some territory, but their gains will be nevertheless minimal. We expect no sizable Russian offensive in this part of Ukraine.” While positional battles continued, Russians made no gains last week. We were correct in anticipating no Russian offensive in this direction.

Score: 1/1

“We foresee no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but they primarily seek to test and probe defences and reconnoitre OPFOR positions. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River, including with incendiary ammunition.” This assessment was correct.

Score: 1/1

“We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. The BAF will continue its increased exercise tempo. Unless we have a visual confirmation about a pullback of Russian forces from Belarus, we would like not to make any predictions on whether or not more Russians will arrive therein. However, chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.” This forecast was correct. Belarusian indeed continued what now appears to be their standard exercise pace. Nothing suggests Russia and Belarus were massing their forces to conduct an attack on Ukraine.

Score: 1/1

Final score: 7.5/9 (83%)

Next week’s forecast

Russians will likely maintain the scale of their attacks in the Kharkiv Oblast. Currently, the scale of these attacks resembles positional battles/reconnaissance-by-force assaults. We believe that there is roughly even chance that they will bring frontline changes in the oblast next week. We continue to see no preparations or indicators suggesting a sizable attack. Russians will also certainly continue to conduct artillery strikes on civilian areas in the Kharkiv Oblast and other regions near the state border.

For next week’s prediction, we will stick to what we wrote last week. Based on current operations, it is likely that no significant changes will occur in the wider Luhansk Oblast. We continue to maintain that tactical fluctuations are highly likely, but neither side will be able to turn these into operational successes. Despite reports about the upcoming Russian offensive, we see no evidence confirming Moscow is building its forces in the Luhansk Oblast.

Ukrainian posture near Kreminna is now entirely focused on defence. Possibilities are remote that Kyiv’s forces will make any gains in this area last week. On the other hand, Russians will likely capture more territory west and south of Kreminna.

We do not foresee major changes in the Donetsk Oblast. Russian attacks will almost certainly persist, but their ability to capture new territories is limited. They may capture some settlements, but the impact on the operational picture will be limited. We continue to see no evidence to suggest Russians are preparing for a broader offensive in this direction. Based on last week’s Russian failures to capture Vuhledar, we assess that it is highly unlikely that the settlement will be taken next week.

Russians are likely to progress in the Soledar-Bakhmut sector. Firstly, given that the focus is on Krasna Hora, it is highly likely that they will capture some territory in this sector. Unless Ukrainians deploy reserves and counterattack, we assess that it is likely that Russians will continue to move forward. When it comes to attacks on Vasyukivka and Rozdolivka, there is roughly even chance that Russians will make progress on these axes, given that the emphasis is on areas towards Bakhmut.

Regarding Bakhmut, we are amending our last week’s prognosis. Unless Ukrainians start withdrawing, Russians are only likely to make incremental gains within the city. Last week we noted that “it is highly improbable that Ukrainians will pull back from Bakhmut.” This week, however, given that Russians reportedly started approaching (and in some places temporarily cutting off) the road linking Bakhmut with Kostyantynivka), we assess that it is possible that Ukrainians will start leaving Bakhmut. The fall of Ivanivske is also possible. The situation is complex, and the withdrawal is contingent on many factors, but the trajectory near Bakhmut is negative for Ukrainians.

Regarding the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, it is likely that Russian positional attacks will continue. It is unlikely, however, that Russians will capture some territory. We expect no sizable Russian offensive in this part of Ukraine.

We foresee no changes in the Kherson Oblast. River infiltration operations from both sides will continue, but they primarily seek to test and probe defences and reconnoitre OPFOR positions. Russians will continue to strike civilian areas north of the Dnipro River, including with incendiary ammunition.

We expect no changes in the posture of the Belarusian Armed Forces (BAF) and Russian units deployed to Belarus. The BAF will continue its increased exercise tempo. Chances are remote that Russians will attack Ukraine from Belarus next week.